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INTRODUCTION 
Hardly a day goes by now without revelations that some entity—
whether a government agency, a leading academic institution, or a large 
corporation—has been “hacked,” and its electronic data compromised.  
Cybersecurity—a word that did not even exist just a few years ago—is 
now a vital economic and national security concern, and a field of 
endeavor that has engaged many of the brightest minds in the Nation 
and around the world.  Unfortunately, however, many other bright 
minds—often far away, in Russia or China—are just as keenly engaged 
in seeking to circumvent cybersecurity protections.  Modern life thus 
entails a constant game of cat-and-mouse between cybersecurity 
professionals and sophisticated cyber-criminals.  No entity or person is 
immune from the threat.  
Appellant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, LLC (“Wyndham”) was 
among the victims.  On three occasions between 2008 and 2010, 
sophisticated criminal hackers (apparently from Russia) gained 
unauthorized access into Wyndham’s computer network as well as the 
computer networks of several Wyndham-branded hotels.  By breaching 
the networks of the Wyndham-branded hotels, the attacks compromised 
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payment-card information that those hotels had collected from 
customers.  Wyndham promptly reported these “hacking” incidents to 
law-enforcement authorities. 
Instead of trying to develop national cybersecurity standards, or 
otherwise help Wyndham and other American businesses protect 
themselves from this ongoing threat, the Federal Government—through 
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)—responded by launching this 
lawsuit against Wyndham.  According to the FTC, Wyndham engaged 
in “unfair ... acts or practices” in violation of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), by failing to take “reasonable and 
appropriate” measures to protect the data stolen by the criminal 
hackers (who have never been apprehended). 
This lawsuit represents classic administrative overreaching.  
Until the decision below, no court in the history of American law had 
ever interpreted the FTC’s authority over “unfair” business practices to 
encompass a company’s efforts to secure its own computer networks.  
That is no surprise, as the FTC Act is not a federal cybersecurity 
statute; rather, it seeks to protect consumers from unscrupulous 
business practices.  As a matter of law and common sense, a business 
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cannot be deemed to have engaged in an “unfair” practice where, as 
here, that business itself was the victim of criminal conduct by others.  
There is no allegation here (nor could there plausibly be) that Wyndham 
sought to take advantage of its customers, or had any incentive to 
tolerate or encourage the hackers’ crimes.  The word “unfair” may be 
broad, but it is not boundless.  If that word is to have any meaning at 
all—and certainly to avoid serious constitutional concerns—it cannot be 
construed to apply here.  It is implausible, to say the least, that 
Congress gave the FTC regulatory authority over a field as far-reaching 
and complex as cybersecurity by authorizing the agency to regulate 
“unfair” business practices.  
And even assuming arguendo that the FTC had the statutory 
authority to interpret “unfair” business practices to encompass 
cybersecurity, the agency did not provide constitutionally adequate 
notice of what cybersecurity practices violate the statute.  The rule of 
law depends on providing citizens with fair notice of what the law 
requires and proscribes.  And the point here is simple: the FTC has 
never identified any standard, or otherwise provided any meaningful 
guidance, regarding what cybersecurity measures are “reasonable and 
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appropriate.”  In the absence of such guidance, businesses cannot 
conform their conduct to the law, and are subject to enforcement at the 
FTC’s whim—the very antithesis of the rule of law.  The Commission 
has simply anointed itself a roving cybersecurity prosecutor—but, 
unlike other prosecutors, one that seeks to define the offense and to do 
so after the fact.  Precisely because cybersecurity affects everyone—
including the FTC (which itself was recently victimized by 
cyberhackers)—this ad hoc and post hoc prosecutorial regime is neither 
lawful nor desirable. 
What is particularly anomalous here is that the FTC is seeking to 
prosecute a victim of cybercrime, like Wyndham, where no consumer 
suffered a “substantial” injury that was not “avoidable,” and thus the 
FTC cannot establish these statutory requirements for an “unfair” 
business practice.  The FTC’s complaint certainly does not plead any 
facts showing that any consumers sustained substantial and non-
avoidable injuries as a result of the cybercriminals’ attacks on 
Wyndham.  That factual omission is no oversight, as any consumer 
could avoid fraudulent charges by simply notifying his or her payment-
card company.  Thus, above and beyond the far-reaching statutory and 
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constitutional issues presented by this case, the district court should 
have dismissed the “unfair” practice count on the familiar ground that 
the complaint fails to satisfy federal pleading standards. 
Let there be no mistake: cybersecurity is among the most 
significant public policy issues of our times.  And precisely because the 
issue is so important, it must be handled right.  The President, 
Congress, and private stakeholders are engaged in an ongoing dialogue 
on how to address the emerging phenomenon of cybercrime, including 
how best to allocate costs and responsibilities and how to weigh the 
complex interactions of various technologies.  However these issues are 
ultimately resolved, one thing is clear: the FTC is not empowered to 
prosecute businesses for allegedly failing to adopt “reasonable and 
appropriate” cybersecurity practices, particularly when, as discussed in 
this brief, (1) the FTC has no statutory authority to regulate 
cybersecurity, (2) the FTC has failed to provide any fair notice as to 
what constitutes “reasonable and appropriate” cybersecurity, and 
(3) the FTC cannot plead facts to establish substantial or non-avoidable 
injury to consumers. 
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Accordingly, this Court should reverse the order under review and 
direct the district court to enter judgment in Wyndham’s favor on Count 
II of the FTC’s amended complaint. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 1345.  That court denied 
Wyndham’s motion to dismiss the FTC’s complaint on April 7, 2014, 
JA1-43, and certified that order for interlocutory review under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) on June 23, 2014, JA44-53. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because 
it granted Wyndham’s petition for leave to appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) on July 29, 2014.  See JA54-55.   
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES1 
1. Whether an alleged failure to provide “reasonable and 
appropriate” cybersecurity is an “unfair” business practice under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act.  See JA3; JA8-16; Mot. to Dismiss 7-14 
(4/26/13) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 91-1]. 
2. Whether the FTC has provided constitutionally adequate 
notice of what are “reasonable and appropriate” cybersecurity practices.  
See JA3; JA16-26; Mot. to Dismiss 14-19. 
3. Whether the FTC has pleaded sufficient facts to state a 
plausible claim of “substantial” injury to consumers that is not 
“avoidable” by consumers.  See JA3; JA26-34; Mot. to Dismiss 19-23.   
                                      
1 The district court’s order granting Wyndham’s motion to certify this 
appeal for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) framed the 
questions somewhat differently.  See JA52-53.  That difference, 
however, is immaterial.  Certification under § 1292(b) “applies to the 
order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular 
question formulated by the district court.”  Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. 
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996) (emphasis modified).  Accordingly, 
“the appellate court may address any issue fairly included within the 
certified order,” regardless of how the district court framed the issues.  
Id.  All three of the issues presented here are expressly addressed in the 
certified order. 
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES 
This case has never previously been before this Court.  
Proceedings in the district court remain ongoing while this Court 
considers this interlocutory appeal. See No. 2:13-cv-01887 (D.N.J.).   
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Because this appeal arises in the context of a motion to dismiss on 
the pleadings, this Court must accept the truth of the well-pleaded 
factual allegations in the complaint.  See, e.g., Bell v. Cheswick 
Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 193 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013). Although 
Wyndham by no means concedes the truth of the complaint’s factual 
allegations, the key point here is that Wyndham is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law on the “unfairness” count of the complaint regardless 
of the truth of those allegations. 
A. Background 
Wyndham is a hospitality company that provides services to over 
100 hotels operating under the Wyndham brand name.  Am. Compl. 
[Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 28] ¶¶ 9, 13, JA59-61.  With a few exceptions, each of 
those hotels is independently owned by a third party, and the 
independent owners are authorized to use the Wyndham brand name 
pursuant to franchise agreements.  See id.  As part of that franchise 
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relationship, Wyndham operates and maintains a computer network to 
provide certain information technology services to the Wyndham-
branded hotels.  Id. ¶ 16, JA62.  Each Wyndham-branded hotel also 
operates and maintains its own computer network separate from, but 
usually linked to, the Wyndham network.  Id. ¶ 15, JA62.   
On three occasions from 2008 to 2010, sophisticated criminal 
hackers gained unauthorized access into the Wyndham computer 
network and the computer networks of several Wyndham-branded 
hotels.  Id. ¶ 25, JA67-68.  On each occasion, the hackers were able “to 
access personal information stored on the Wyndham-branded hotels’ 
property management system servers, including customers’ payment 
card account numbers, expiration dates, and security codes.”  Id.  The 
hackers exported the data “to a domain registered in Russia.”  Id. ¶¶ 2, 
32, 40, JA57, 70, 73.   
In the aftermath of these cyberattacks, the FTC launched an 
investigation into Wyndham’s data-security practices.  Over the course 
of that two-year investigation, Wyndham produced over one million 
pages of documents, answered over fifty written interrogatories, and 
gave seven in-person presentations.   
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B. Proceedings Below 
On June 26, 2012, the Commission filed this lawsuit against 
Wyndham and three corporate affiliates in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Arizona.  See Compl. (6/26/12) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 1].  The 
complaint, as amended, alleges that defendants “have failed to employ 
reasonable and appropriate measures to protect personal information 
against unauthorized access.”  Am. Compl. (8/9/12) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 
28] ¶ 47, JA74; see also id. ¶ 1, JA57 (alleging that defendants “fail[ed] 
to maintain reasonable and appropriate data security for consumers’ 
sensitive personal information”).  As relevant here, Count II of the 
complaint alleges that these actions “constitute unfair acts or practices 
in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) and 45(n).”  
Id. ¶ 49, JA74.2  As relief, the FTC requests (1) “a permanent injunction 
to prevent future violations of the FTC Act by Defendants,” (2) “such 
relief as the Court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers 
                                      
2 Count I of the complaint alleges that defendants also engaged in 
“deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 45(a),” on the theory that “in connection with the 
advertising, marketing, promotion, offering for sale, or sale of hotel 
services, Defendants have represented, directly or indirectly, expressly 
or by implication, that they had implemented reasonable and 
appropriate measures to protect personal information against 
unauthorized access.”  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44, 46, JA73-74.   
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resulting from Defendants’ violations of the FTC Act, including but not 
limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, restitution, the refund 
of monies paid, and the disgorgement of ill-gotten monies,” and (3) an 
award of “the costs of bringing this action.”  Id., Prayer for Relief, JA75-
76.   
Defendants promptly moved to transfer the case to New Jersey, 
where they are headquartered.  Over the FTC’s objection, the Arizona 
district court (Rosenblatt, J.) granted the motion.  See Order (3/25/13) 
[Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 77].   
Wyndham thereafter moved to dismiss Count II of the 
complaint—the “unfair” practices count—as a matter of law on the 
grounds that (1) the FTC lacks the authority to regulate cybersecurity 
under Section 5 of the FTC Act, (2) even if the FTC had such authority, 
it failed to provide constitutionally adequate notice of what 
cybersecurity practices were required, and (3) the FTC’s complaint 
failed to plead facts sufficient to establish a plausible violation of the 
Act.  See Mot. to Dismiss (4/26/13) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 91-1].3  After 
                                      
3 Concurrent with Wyndham’s motion to dismiss, the three other 
defendants (Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, Wyndham Hotel Group, 
LLC, and Wyndham Hotel Management, Inc.) filed a separate motion to 
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hearing argument on the matter, see Tr. (11/7/13) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 
139], JA79-264, the district court (Salas, J.) denied the motion, see 
Opinion (4/7/14) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 181], JA2-43; Order (4/7/14) [Dist. 
Ct. Dkt. No. 182], JA1.   
In denying the motion, the district court repeatedly characterized 
Wyndham’s position as seeking to “carve out a data-security exception to 
the FTC’s authority.”  JA7 (emphasis added); see also JA11 (same); 
JA15 (same); JA16 (same).  A request to “carve out” an “exception” to 
agency authority, of course, presupposes that the agency had such 
authority in the first place.  But Wyndham’s position is just the 
opposite: that Section 5 of the FTC Act never gave the FTC the 
authority to regulate cybersecurity as an “unfair” business practice at 
all.  The district court simply dodged that bedrock issue by insisting 
                                                                                                                         
dismiss “to address certain elements of the FTC’s allegations that 
pertain only to them”—the FTC’s attempt “to hold those separate 
corporate entities derivatively liable for the allegedly unlawful conduct 
that was undertaken by [Wyndham] alone.”  Mot. to Dismiss (4/26/13) 
[Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 92-1].  The district court denied that motion on the 
same day that it granted Wyndham’s motion to certify this appeal for 
interlocutory review.  See Opinion (6/23/14) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 201]; 
Order (6/23/14) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 202].  Accordingly, the order denying 
the other defendants’ motion to dismiss is not within the scope of this 
interlocutory appeal. 
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that Wyndham had failed to demonstrate that Congress had “carved 
out” a cybersecurity “exception” to the FTC’s authority.  And the court 
similarly dodged Wyndham’s fair-notice argument by insisting that “the 
FTC need not formally issue regulations ... before bringing its 
unfairness claim,” JA3—thereby again rejecting an argument that 
Wyndham had never made.4 
The district court, however, granted Wyndham’s subsequent 
motion to certify the order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b).  See Order (6/23/14) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 203], JA44-53.  In the 
certification order, the court held that “reasonable jurists may differ 
over the Court’s resolution” of the issues decided in the order denying 
the motion to dismiss.  JA49.  Specifically, the court opined that the 
“statutory authority and fair-notice challenges confront this Court with 
novel, complex statutory interpretation issues that give rise to a 
                                      
4 The district court also denied Wyndham’s motion to dismiss the 
FTC’s complaint insofar as it related to Count I, the “deception” count, 
which charges Wyndham with making false or misleading 
representations about its cybersecurity practices.  See JA34-43.  
Although Wyndham also disagrees with the district court’s order on this 
issue, Count I does not present any overriding question of statutory or 
constitutional interpretation, and hence Wyndham did not seek 
interlocutory review on that issue.   
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substantial ground for difference of opinion.”  Id.  The court also 
acknowledged “the absence of precedent directly addressing the pure 
questions of law” at stake here.  JA52. 
This Court subsequently granted Wyndham’s petition for leave to 
appeal.  See Order (7/29/14), JA54-55.  Meanwhile, proceedings in the 
district court continue apace.  To date, the FTC has served 111 
document requests, sought leave to take the depositions of 35 fact 
witnesses, see Proposed Joint Discovery Plan at 8 (12/18/13) [Dist. Ct. 
Dkt. No. 143-1], and sought a five-month extension of the fact-discovery 
period, see K. Moriarty Letter to the Court (7/14/14) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 
211].  The district court limited the FTC to 100 hours of depositions, see 
Pretrial Scheduling Order (1/7/14) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 148], and 
extended the fact-discovery period by approximately three months, see 
Amended Scheduling Order (8/13/14) [Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 224].  Fact 
discovery is now scheduled to close in December 2014, and expert 
discovery is scheduled to begin shortly thereafter.  Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the district court’s order denying 
Wyndham’s motion to dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint—the 
“unfair” practices count—for three separate reasons.   
First, the FTC’s authority to regulate “unfair” business practices 
does not extend, as a matter of law, to regulating a company’s 
cybersecurity practices.  A business treats consumers unfairly when it 
seeks to take advantage of them, or otherwise injures them through 
unscrupulous or unethical behavior.  As a matter of law and logic, a 
business does not treat its customers unfairly when the business itself 
is victimized by criminals, and the business’ customers are thereby 
injured (if at all) only derivatively.  The FTC’s authority to regulate 
“unfair” business practices thus does not encompass the authority to 
regulate the practices by which a business protects itself (and hence, 
derivatively, its customers) from criminals.  If Congress had intended to 
give the FTC vast powers over cybersecurity (or other forms of business 
security), it could and would have done so much more clearly than 
allowing the Commission to regulate “unfair” business practices.  And 
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because the statutory term “unfair” cannot be stretched so far, the FTC 
is not entitled to any deference on this score.  
Second, the FTC’s attempt to exercise its supposed cybersecurity 
authority here does not comport with basic norms of fair notice 
protected by the Due Process Clause.  The FTC alleges that Wyndham’s 
cybersecurity practices are not “reasonable or appropriate.”  But the 
FTC has never provided any notice as to what “reasonable or 
appropriate” cybersecurity practices might be, either for Wyndham or 
for any other business of any size.  In essence, the Commission has 
adopted a “we know it when we see it” approach that leaves every 
business in the land vulnerable to selective enforcement.  That 
approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the rule of law, which 
depends upon providing fair notice of what the law requires and 
proscribes.   
And third, above and beyond those far-reaching statutory and 
constitutional issues, the FTC’s complaint fails to plead facts to state a 
plausible claim of a violation of the statute.  Among other things, an 
“unfair” business practice must cause “substantial” injury to consumers 
that is not “avoidable” by consumers.  The complaint here fails to plead 
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any facts showing that consumers have sustained substantial and non-
avoidable injuries.  That is not surprising, as any consumer could avoid 
any fraudulent charges by simply notifying his or her payment-card 
company.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim.  See, e.g., McTernan v. City of York, 
577 F.3d 521, 526, 530-31 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).  
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 570).  “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a 
complaint must plead specific facts that raise “more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
678.  A court need not, and may not, accept legal conclusions packaged 
as factual allegations.  See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 555-56.   
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ARGUMENT 
I. An Alleged Failure To Provide “Reasonable And 
Appropriate” Cybersecurity Is Not An “Unfair” Business 
Practice Under Section 5 Of The FTC Act. 
The district court erred, first and foremost, by assuming the 
answer to the core question presented here: whether the FTC’s 
authority over “unfair” business practices, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), 
encompasses a company’s alleged failure to adopt “reasonable and 
appropriate” measures to protect its computer networks from hackers.  
Administrative agencies are creatures of statute, and thus “an agency 
literally has no power to act ... unless and until Congress confers power 
upon it.”  Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 
(1986).  The district court missed this fundamental point by holding 
that Wyndham had failed to demonstrate the need to “carve out a data-
security exception to the FTC’s authority.”  JA7 (emphasis added); see 
also JA11 (same); JA15 (same); JA16 (same).  This case is not about “a 
data-security exception to the FTC’s authority”; it is about the scope of 
the FTC’s authority to regulate “unfair” business practices in the first 
place.   
As a matter of ordinary English, an “unfair” business practice is 
one “marked by injustice, partiality, or deception,” i.e., one that is “not 
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equitable.”  Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988); see also 
LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1200 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam) (“The plain meaning of ‘unfair’ is ‘marked by injustice, 
partiality, or deception.’”) (internal quotation omitted).  There is no 
reason to think that the meaning of the word “unfair” in the FTC Act 
differs from its meaning in ordinary English.  Although it may be 
impossible “to attempt a comprehensive definition of the unfair methods 
which are banned” by the Act, FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 
304, 314 (1934), that does not mean that the scope of the word “unfair” 
is boundless, see, e.g., Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 643-44 
(3d Cir. 1941).  It is the courts’ responsibility to enforce the boundaries 
of that statutory term.  “[T]he Commission is hardly free to write its 
own law of consumer protection,” and “the judiciary remains the final 
authority with respect to questions of statutory construction and must 
reject administrative agency actions which exceed the agency’s 
statutory mandate or frustrate congressional intent.”  American Fin. 
Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (internal 
quotation omitted).  A court owes an administrative agency no 
deference where, as here, the court is called upon to enforce the 
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boundaries of Congress’ statutory delegation of authority to the agency 
in the first place.  See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984); see also National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l 
Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1998); Prestol-Espinal v. 
Attorney General of U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 2011).   
The key point here is that the term “unfair” in Section 5 of the 
FTC Act cannot be stretched to encompass a company’s alleged failure 
to adopt “reasonable and appropriate” measures to protect its computer 
networks from hackers.  That provision, as relevant here, governs a 
business’ acts or practices vis-à-vis consumers.  See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry 
& Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).5  A 
business treats consumers “unfairly” when it seeks to take advantage of 
them, or otherwise injures them through unscrupulous or unethical 
                                      
5 As originally enacted in 1914, the FTC Act proscribed only “unfair 
methods of competition.”  Pub. L. No. 203, 38 Stat. 719 (1914).  The 
statute was amended in 1938 to extend the statute’s scope to “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”  See Pub. L. No. 447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).  
The legislative history of the 1938 amendment states that Congress 
sought to “make[] the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade 
practice, of equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or 
manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 75-1613, at 3 (1937); see also S. Rep. No. 74-1705, at 2-3 
(1936). 
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behavior.  See, e.g., R.F. Keppel, 291 U.S. at 313.  As a matter of law 
and logic, a business does not treat its customers in an “unfair” manner 
when the business itself is victimized by criminals.  Regardless of 
whether the business could or should have done more to thwart the 
criminals, it is not acting “unfairly” to its customers under these 
circumstances: it has not sought to take advantage of them, and it 
certainly has no incentive to tolerate or encourage crimes against itself.  
After all, any injury to consumers is derivative of the injury to the 
business itself from the crime.  
The Commission seeks to sidestep this point by referring to 
Section 5(n) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  That approach is not only 
misguided, but ironic.  Congress added that provision to the statute in 
1994 (after substantial controversy about several of the Commission’s 
regulatory efforts) to limit the agency’s discretion to declare business 
acts or practices “unfair.”  See FTC Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-312, § 9, 108 Stat. 1691, 1695 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)).  
Section 5(n) specifies that “[t]he Commission shall have no authority ... 
to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or 
practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause 
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substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (emphasis added).  By 
its plain terms, that provision adds requirements to the “unfairness” 
determination; it does not subtract anything.  Thus, in order for an act 
or practice to be “unfair” under Section 5(a), it is necessary but not 
sufficient that it meet the criteria of Section 5(n).  An act or practice 
that is not otherwise unfair does not become “unfair” within the 
meaning of the statute just because it satisfies Section 5(n).     
The district court’s decision suggests no meaningful limiting 
principle on the scope of the statutory word “unfair.”  If the FTC’s 
regulatory jurisdiction extends to any and all business acts or practices 
that may in some way result in injury to consumers—even if those acts 
or practices do not involve any element of unfairness to the 
consumers—then the FTC’s regulatory jurisdiction over American 
business is boundless.  Under this view, the FTC could regulate not just 
data security, but any act or practice by any consumer business.  
Certainly, cybersecurity is no different in kind from physical security, 
so the FTC’s assertion of regulatory authority here, if upheld, would 
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logically mean that the FTC has authority to regulate the locks on hotel 
room doors or to require every store in the land to post an armed guard 
at the door.  But none of this, of course, has anything to do with “unfair” 
trade practices under the FTC Act.  Just because cybersecurity is an 
important issue does not mean that the FTC has the statutory 
authority to regulate it.  “Regardless of how serious the problem an 
administrative agency seeks to address, ... it may not exercise its 
authority in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative 
structure that Congress enacted into law.”  FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).   
It is far-fetched, to say the least, to suppose that Congress gave 
the FTC not only the authority to protect consumers from “unfair” 
business practices but also a roving commission to safeguard consumer 
information.  As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, courts should 
meet an agency’s assertion of such far-reaching authority “with a 
measure of skepticism,” particularly where, as here, the agency “claims 
to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a 
significant portion of the American economy.”  Utility Air Regulatory 
Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (internal quotation omitted).  
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That skepticism is warranted, the Court explained, because Congress 
will ordinarily “speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency 
decisions of vast economic and political significance”—decisions such as 
what are “reasonable and appropriate” cybersecurity practices in an age 
in which information technology pervades American businesses of all 
sizes and in all industries.  Id. 
Indeed, in recent years, Congress has enacted statutes that 
specifically authorize the FTC to establish federal cybersecurity 
standards in certain narrow and defined sectors of the economy.  For 
instance, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) imposes requirements 
for the collection, disclosure, and disposal of data collected by consumer 
reporting agencies, and directs the FTC and other federal agencies to 
develop additional regulations for financial institutions to protect 
sensitive consumer data and reduce the incidence of identity theft.  See 
Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 216(a), 117 Stat. 1952, 1985 (2003) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681w).  Similarly, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (“GLBA”) directs the FTC and federal banking regulators to 
“establish appropriate standards” for “administrative, technical, and 
physical safeguards” that (1) “insure the security and confidentiality of 
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customer records and information” held by certain financial 
institutions; (2) “protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to 
the security or integrity of such records”; and (3) “protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of such records or information.”  Pub. L. 
No. 106-102, § 501(b), 113 Stat. 1338, 1346-47 (1999) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b)).6 
These tailored grants of substantive authority to the FTC in the 
cybersecurity field would be inexplicable if the Commission already had 
general substantive authority over this field.  See, e.g., Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143 (“The ‘classic judicial task of reconciling 
many laws enacted over time, and getting them to ‘make sense’ in 
combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may 
be altered by the implications of a later statute.’  This is particularly so 
                                      
6 In addition, Congress has enacted several other statutes to address 
cybersecurity concerns in discrete and tailored segments of the national 
economy.  See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 
(“COPPA”), Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1303-06, 112 Stat. 2681, 2730-35 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6502-05); Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 262(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 2025-26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d-2(d)); Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act (“HITECH”), Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13402(h), 123 Stat. 115, 
262-63 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 17932(h)).     
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where the scope of the earlier statute is broad but the subsequent 
statutes more specifically address the topic at hand.’”) (quoting United 
States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)); United States v. Estate of 
Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530-31 (1998) (“[A] specific policy embodied in a 
later federal statute should control our construction of the [earlier] 
statute, even though it ha[s] not been expressly amended.”); West Va. 
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) (“[I]t is our role to 
make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.”).   
The district court, however, declared that “subsequent data-
security legislation seems to complement—not preclude—the FTC’s 
authority.”  JA12 (emphasis in original).  But these recent statutes 
cannot be dismissed as simply interstitial or supplemental; to the 
contrary, they presuppose the absence, not the presence, of pre-existing 
substantive authority in this area.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)(1)(A) 
(FCRA provision directing the FTC and other federal agencies to 
“establish and maintain guidelines for use by each financial institution 
and each creditor regarding identity theft with respect to 
accountholders”); id. § 1681s(a)(1) (FCRA provision authorizing the FTC 
“to enforce compliance with the requirements imposed by” that statute); 
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id. § 6804(a)(1)(C) (GLBA provision granting the FTC authority to 
“prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the 
purposes” of the statute, including its data-security provisions); id. 
§ 6805(a)(7) (GLBA provision directing the FTC to enforce that statute 
“and the regulations prescribed thereunder”).  Congress knows how to 
target cybersecurity when it wishes to do so, and Congress did not do so 
in the “unfair” practices provision of the FTC Act.  See, e.g., Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160. 
Indeed, the legislative history of the FCRA and GLBA refutes any 
suggestion that these statutes were enacted merely to supplement some 
pre-existing general authority over cybersecurity.  Each statute was 
enacted in response to congressional concerns over the collection and 
misuse of sensitive consumer data.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 108-396, at 
65-66 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that the 2003 amendments to the 
FCRA, which granted the FTC narrow data-security authority over 
disposal of certain information derived from consumer credit reports, 
were enacted in response to “the explosive growth of a new crime—
identity theft”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 106-74, pt. 3, at 117-19 (1999) 
(committee report on the GLBA).  The whole reason for enacting these 
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statutes was that Congress believed that data security was not covered 
by existing statutory provisions, including Section 5 of the FTC Act.  It 
would certainly have been strange for Congress to enact these carefully 
tailored statutes to give the FTC a scalpel in the emerging cybersecurity 
field if the Commission already wielded a meat-axe.  
In addition, the Commission’s interpretation of Section 5 is 
inconsistent with its repeated efforts to obtain from Congress the very 
authority it purports to wield here.  For over a decade, the FTC has 
lobbied in favor of legislation that would establish substantive federal 
cybersecurity standards for American business, and give the FTC the 
authority to enforce those standards.  See, e.g., Consumer Data 
Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of 
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong., 2011 WL 2358081, 
at 6 (June 15, 2011) (statement of Edith Ramirez, Commissioner, FTC); 
Data Theft Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & 
Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong., 2011 WL 
1971214, at 7 (May 4, 2011) (statement of David C. Vladeck, Director, 
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection); FTC, Privacy Online: Fair 
Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: A Report to 
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Congress, at 36-37 (May 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-
electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission; Privacy in 
Cyberspace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade & 
Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong., 1998 
WL 546441, at 9-10 & n.23 (July 21, 1998) (statement of Robert 
Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC); see also Michael D. Scott, The FTC, The 
Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has The 
Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 127, 130-31 (2008). 
Indeed, consistent with these requests for authority, Congress has 
considered a variety of cybersecurity bills—including one that would 
have required the Secretary of Homeland Security to “identify or 
develop, on a sector-by-sector basis, risk-based cybersecurity 
performance requirements,” S. 2105, 112th Cong. § 104 (2012), and 
another that would have required businesses to establish 
“administrative, technical, or physical safeguards identified by the 
Federal Trade Commission in a rulemaking process” to protect 
consumer data, S. 1151, 112th Cong. § 302 (2011).  After much debate, 
however, none of these bills passed.  Thus, in February 2013, the 
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President issued an Executive Order and a Presidential Policy Directive 
on cybersecurity issues, which require the development of minimum 
data-security standards for businesses operating critical-infrastructure 
systems or assets.  See Exec. Order. No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 
(Feb. 12, 2013); Presidential Policy Directive PPD-21 (Feb. 12, 2013).  
Needless to say, this activity would make no sense if the FTC already 
had sweeping authority to regulate cybersecurity as an “unfair” 
business practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act.   
Moreover, the intense legislative debate surrounding these and 
numerous other cybersecurity bills, e.g., S. 1976, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 
1927, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 3414, 112th Cong. (2012), demonstrates 
the importance and sensitivity of establishing federal cybersecurity 
standards.  Courts must “be guided to a degree by common sense as to 
the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of 
such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.”  
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133.  In light of the important 
economic and political considerations involved in establishing federal 
cybersecurity standards for the private sector, and the intense political 
debate that has surrounded efforts to enact such standards, it defies 
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“common sense” to suppose that Congress delegated that responsibility 
to the FTC through a statute that does nothing more than proscribe 
“unfair” business practices.  See id. at 160 (“Congress could not have 
intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political 
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”); see also Utility Air 
Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (explaining that EPA’s claimed 
authority to regulate certain greenhouse gas emissions amounts to 
“extravagant statutory power over the national economy” that “falls 
comfortably within the class of authorizations that we have been 
reluctant to read into ambiguous statutory text”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (rejecting the “idea that Congress gave the 
Attorney General such broad and unusual authority through an implicit 
delegation”); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 
468 (2001) (“[W]e find it implausible that Congress would give to the 
EPA through ... modest words the power to determine whether 
implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards.”); 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229, 231 (1994) 
(holding that the FCC’s power to “modify” requirements in the 
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communications laws does not include the power to make “radical or 
fundamental” changes to regulatory requirements). 
The district court below thus missed the point by asserting that 
“the FTC’s unfairness authority over data security can coexist with the 
existing data-security regulatory scheme.”  JA13.  The issue here is not 
whether such authority can coexist, but whether Congress intended for 
such coexistence.  The subsequent legislative activity only confirms that 
the statutory grant of authority over “unfair” business practices does 
not extend to cybersecurity measures in the first place.  To conclude 
that the FTC has the authority to regulate cybersecurity would require 
not only an implausible interpretation of “unfairness”—a concept 
central to the FTC Act’s entire regulatory scheme—but also ignore the 
plain implication of Congress’ subsequent cybersecurity-specific 
legislation.  See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-60.   
Finally, even if it were a close question whether the FTC’s 
authority to regulate “unfair” trade practices encompasses the authority 
to regulate cybersecurity, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance would 
compel a negative answer.  That doctrine requires courts, when 
choosing between competing interpretations of a statute, to choose the 
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interpretation that would avoid a serious constitutional question.  See, 
e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (“‘[I]t is a cardinal 
principle’ of statutory interpretation ... that when an Act of Congress 
raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 
which the question may be avoided.’”) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22, 62 (1932)); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here 
an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid 
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent 
of Congress.”).  And this doctrine provides yet another basis for 
rejecting an administrative agency’s request for judicial deference: 
courts need not, and may not, defer to agency interpretations of a 
statute that raise serious constitutional questions.  See, e.g., Solid 
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 174 (2001); Scientific Mfg., 124 F.2d at 644 (rejecting FTC 
interpretation of its Section 5 authority over “unfair” business practices 
that raised serious First Amendment question).  Here, the FTC’s 
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proffered interpretation of the statute raises a serious non-delegation 
question.   
The non-delegation doctrine recognizes that the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to legislate, and Congress may not delegate that 
power to administrative agencies through standardless delegations of 
authority.  See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 
(1989).  If the power to regulate “unfair” business practices extends to 
the power to regulate cybersecurity, then the term “unfair” is effectively 
boundless, and Congress has unconstitutionally delegated legislative 
power to the FTC.  The interpretation proposed here, in contrast, 
provides an “intelligible principle” to narrow the agency’s discretion and 
thus avoids the serious constitutional problem posed by the FTC’s 
interpretation.  “A construction of the statute that avoids [an] open-
ended grant should certainly be favored.”  Industrial Union Dep’t v. 
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (plurality opinion); 
see also National Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 
336, 342 (1974) (construing statute to avoid non-delegation question); cf. 
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7 (“In recent years, our application of the 
nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the 
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interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving 
narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be 
thought to be unconstitutional.”).  Accordingly, this Court should hold 
that the FTC’s authority to regulate “unfair” business practices does not 
encompass the authority to regulate cybersecurity.   
II. The FTC Has Not Provided Constitutionally Adequate 
Notice Of What Are “Reasonable And Appropriate” 
Cybersecurity Practices.   
The district court also erred by refusing to dismiss the FTC’s 
complaint on constitutional fair-notice grounds.  See JA16-26.  It is a 
“fundamental principle in our legal system that laws which regulate 
persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or 
required.”  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 
(2012); see also PMD Produce Brokerage Corp. v. USDA, 234 F.3d 48, 52 
(D.C. Cir. 2000); General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995).  Only where “a regulated party acting in good faith would be 
able to identify, with ‘ascertainable certainty,’ the standards with which 
the agency expects parties to conform” has an agency provided fair 
notice of the law.  General Elec., 53 F.3d at 1329 (internal quotation 
omitted).  “This requirement of clarity in regulations is essential to the 
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protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”  Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2317.   
The complaint in this case charges Wyndham with violating the 
law by failing to adopt “reasonable and appropriate” cybersecurity 
practices.  See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 47, JA57, 74.  But the FTC has 
never provided any guidance as to what cybersecurity practices are 
“reasonable and appropriate” in an era in which cybersecurity breaches 
are, unfortunately, a daily occurrence.  See Verizon Enterprise 
Solutions, 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report at 2, available at 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2014 (identifying, in 2013 
alone, 63,437 “confirmed security incidents” that resulted in 1,367 
“confirmed data breaches”).  Thus, regulated entities like Wyndham had 
(and have) no way of conforming their conduct to the law, and the 
statute is a dragnet for the FTC to hold virtually any business in the 
land liable for violating an unknown (and unknowable) standard.  
Because that violates due process, the case should have been dismissed 
on this ground too.  See, e.g., Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2317-20 (FCC could not 
find that companies violated the law, or fine them, when they lacked 
fair notice that their actions could violate the law); PMD, 234 F.3d at 52 
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(USDA could not sanction company without providing fair notice of its 
rules); General Elec., 53 F.3d at 1328-34 (EPA could not impose fine on 
company without providing fair notice of its regulations).    
In particular, the FTC has provided no guidance on what 
cybersecurity practices businesses must adopt (or avoid) to comply with 
the law.  For instance, the Commission has provided no guidance as to 
(1) what firewall configurations a business must employ, (2) what types 
of MAC or IP address authentication are necessary, (3) what encryption 
techniques must be used to secure consumer data, or (4) what password 
requirements a business must impose on its employees.  Yet the FTC 
alleged that Wyndham’s data security was deficient in each of those 
four areas.  See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24(a), (b), (f), (j), JA65-67.   
The FTC’s failure to provide fair notice is no mere oversight.  
Rather, as one Commissioner explained earlier this year, the 
Commission has deliberately chosen an enforcement regime that is “ex 
post rather than ex ante” and “enforcement-centric rather than 
rulemaking-centric.”  Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Procrustean Problem 
with Prescriptive Regulation, Remarks at the Free State Foundation 
Telecom Conference at 11 (Mar. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Ohlhausen, The 
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Procrustean Problem], available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/public_statements/291361/140318fsf.pdf.  The 
Commission has eschewed the “prescriptive ex ante” approach taken by 
other agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission, on 
the ground that such an approach is “very time consuming” and “not 
well suited to regulating the rapidly evolving Internet.”  Id. at 7.  As 
another Commissioner recently put it, “[r]eflexive resistance to the 
imposition of any meaningful limits on the Commission from those who 
envision an agency with unbounded discretion is predictable.”  Joshua 
D. Wright et al., Defining Section 5 of the FTC Act: The Failure of the 
Common Law Method and the Case for Formal Agency Guidelines, 21 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1289, 1293 (2014).   
The district court below framed the fair-notice issue here as 
whether “the FTC must formally promulgate regulations before 
bringing its unfairness claim.”  JA3; see also JA19 (“[T]he issue is 
whether fair notice requires the FTC to formally issue rules and 
regulations before it can file an unfairness claim in federal district 
court.”) (emphasis omitted);  JA21 (“[Wyndham’s] arguments boil down 
to one proposition: the FTC cannot bring an enforcement action under 
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Section 5’s unfairness prong without first formally publishing rules and 
regulations.”); JA53 (framing issue as “[w]hether the [FTC] must 
formally promulgate regulations before bringing its unfairness claim 
under Section 5 of the [FTC] Act”).  With all respect, that 
characterization of Wyndham’s position is a straw man.  Wyndham has 
never disputed the general principle that administrative agencies have 
discretion to regulate through either rulemaking or adjudication.  See, 
e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974).  Rather, 
Wyndham’s point is only that, however an agency chooses to proceed, it 
must provide regulated entities with constitutionally requisite fair 
notice.   
The district court held that the FTC had provided regulated 
entities with fair notice of the cybersecurity practices required by the 
statute for three basic reasons.  See JA23-26.  None has merit.   
First, the court stated that “Section 5 codifies a three-part test 
that proscribes whether an act is ‘unfair.’”  JA23 (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(n)); see also JA26 (“[A] statutorily-defined standard exists for 
asserting an unfairness claim.”).  As noted above, however, Section 5(n) 
does not set forth a test for “whether an act is ‘unfair’”; rather, it 
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specifies that an act or practice is not “unfair” unless “the act or practice 
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(n).  But those limitations on the FTC’s unfairness authority say 
nothing about data security, and thus in no way assist a business in 
determining whether its cybersecurity practices comply with the Act.   
The district court insisted, however, that at common law, “liability 
is routinely found for unreasonable conduct without the need for 
particularized prohibitions.”  JA23 (emphasis in original).  The short 
answer to that point is that liability under the FTC Act is not bounded 
by the common law.  See, e.g., Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 240-44; 
FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953); R.F. 
Keppel, 291 U.S. at 310-12.  Because the common law does not limit the 
scope of the FTC Act, it follows that the common law cannot resolve the 
fair-notice issue here.   
Second, the district court relied on “many public complaints” 
brought by the FTC challenging business cybersecurity practices, and 
“consent agreements” resolving such complaints.  JA25.  According to 
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the court, these complaints and consent agreements “‘constitute a body 
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.’”  Id. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (emphasis omitted)).   
But complaints and consent agreements are not adjudications on 
the merits, and “do[] not establish illegal conduct.”  Intergraph Corp. v. 
Intel Corp., 253 F.3d 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  Because a complaint or 
a consent decree “is not a decision on the merits and therefore does not 
adjudicate the legality of any action by any party thereto,” it does not 
and cannot provide fair notice of what the law either requires or 
proscribes.  Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 312 (7th Cir. 
1976); see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 
316, 330 n.12 (1961) (“The circumstances surrounding ... negotiated 
[consent agreements] are so different that they cannot be persuasively 
cited in a litigation context.”) (emphasis added).  The decision to settle, 
rather than fight, an FTC complaint may reflect nothing more than a 
pragmatic business decision to avoid costly and protracted litigation. 
And even if the Commission’s prior cybersecurity complaints and 
consent agreements could, as a legal matter, provide fair notice (which 
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they cannot) the prior complaints and consent agreements at issue here 
contain only very general language that does not allow other regulated 
entities to ascertain what the law actually requires with respect to 
cybersecurity.  Most of the complaints involve allegedly “deceptive” 
practices, and thus provide no guidance on what practices are allegedly 
“unfair.”  And most of the complaints fail to spell out what specific 
cybersecurity practices (or lack thereof) actually triggered the alleged 
violation; instead, they provide only a vague description of certain 
alleged problems that, “taken together,” reflect a failure to provide 
“reasonable and appropriate” cybersecurity.  See, e.g., Compl. at 2, In 
the Matter of EPN, Inc., FTC File No. 112 3143 (June 7, 2012), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/06/120607 
epncmpt.pdf; Compl. at 2, In the Matter of Dave & Buster’s, Inc., FTC 
File No. 082 3153 (Mar. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/03/100325da
vebusterscmpt.pdf; Compl. at 3, In the Matter of Reed Elsevier, Inc. & 
Seisint, Inc., FTC File No. 052 3094 (Mar. 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/03/080327co
mplaint.pdf.  And the consent agreements that do address unfairness do 
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so only in vague generalities.  See, e.g., Agreement Containing Consent 
Order at 2, In the Matter of Dave and Buster’s, Inc., FTC File No. 082 
3153 (Mar. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/03/100325da
vebustersagree.pdf. (company agrees to implement “administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to [its] size and 
complexity, the nature and scope of [its] activities, and the sensitivity of 
the personal information collected from or about consumers”).   
Third, the court relied on the FTC’s “business guidance brochure” 
regarding cybersecurity.  JA25.  But that brochure is a slim pamphlet 
that consists of such platitudes as: “LOCK IT.  Protect the information 
that you keep.” and “PLAN AHEAD.  Create a plan to respond to 
security incidents.”  FTC, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for 
Business, at 3 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.business.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/bus69-protecting-personal-information-guide-
business_0.pdf.  The document contains little specific guidance on any 
particular cybersecurity practices, and nowhere states that its 
recommendations are required by law.  Moreover, the pamphlet is 
rarely updated to reflect changes in the cybersecurity environment.  For 
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instance, the most recent version of the document dates back nearly 
three years, to November 2011, and thus fails to reflect best practices 
gleaned from any of the recent high-profile data breaches that have 
plagued American businesses (not to mention the FTC itself) in recent 
years.  See, e.g., Hayley Tsukayama, Neiman Marcus confirms data 
breach, offers few details, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 2014; FTC sites hacked 
by Anonymous, USA Today, Feb. 17, 2012.  Given that this brochure 
does not even purport to establish what the law requires, it does not 
provide constitutionally adequate notice to regulated entities. 
In effect, the district court read the constitutional fair-notice 
requirement out of the law with respect to the FTC Act.   In particular, 
the court emphasized that “‘the proscriptions in Section 5 are flexible, to 
be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases from the field of 
business.’”  JA20 (quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 
385 (1965)); see also JA24 (same).  To say that the FTC Act is not 
limited to particular practices, however, is not to say that the Act may 
be applied without regard for constitutional fair-notice principles.  
Rather, the Act may be applied to particular practices insofar as 
regulated entities were on notice that those practices were unlawful.  
Case: 14-3514     Document: 003111758114     Page: 55      Date Filed: 10/06/2014
 45 
 
While a business may be charged with notice that it is unlawful, for 
instance, to advertise that a razor can shave sandpaper by showing a 
mock-up of plexiglass to which sand had been applied, see Colgate-
Palmolive, 380 U.S. at 376, the same is not true of cybersecurity 
practices.   
Contrary to the district court’s assertion, Wyndham does not 
contend that “the FTC would have to cease bringing all unfairness 
actions without first proscribing particularized prohibitions—a result 
that is in direct contradiction with the flexibility necessarily inherent in 
Section 5 of the FTC Act.”  JA26 (emphasis in original).  Wherever the 
precise line for constitutionally adequate notice may lie, this case is 
clearly on the wrong side of it.  To say that Wyndham had 
constitutionally adequate notice that its cybersecurity practices were 
“unfair” in violation of the FTC Act is to write the constitutional fair-
notice requirement out of the law.   
III. The FTC Has Not Pleaded Sufficient Facts To State A 
Plausible Claim Of “Substantial” Injury To Consumers 
That Is Not “Avoidable” By Consumers. 
Finally, above and beyond the substantial statutory and 
constitutional issues discussed above, the district court erred by 
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refusing to dismiss the FTC’s complaint for failure to satisfy federal 
pleading standards.  See JA26-34.  Under those standards, a complaint 
“that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a cause of action will not do.’”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  “Nor does a complaint suffice if it 
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”  
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).  Rather, “[t]o survive a motion 
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Id. 
(emphasis added; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also id. 
(complaint must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged”) (emphasis added).    
The complaint at issue here fails to plead any facts that would 
plausibly suggest a “substantial” injury to consumers that is not 
“avoidable” by consumers, as necessary to establish an “unfair” business 
practice.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  Indeed, the complaint fails to identify 
any consumer who suffered any financial injury as a result of the 
criminal cyberattacks on Wyndham.  Rather, in a paragraph entitled 
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“Total Impact of Breaches,” the complaint simply asserts, in 
conclusory terms, that the cyberattacks caused “substantial” consumer 
injury: 
Defendants’ failure to implement reasonable and 
appropriate security measures exposed consumers’ personal 
information to unauthorized access, collection, and use.  
Such exposure of consumers’ personal information has 
caused and is likely to cause substantial consumer injury, 
including financial injury, to consumers and businesses.  For 
example, Defendants’ failure to implement reasonable and 
appropriate security measures resulted in the three data 
breaches described above, the compromise of more than 
619,000 consumer payment card account numbers, the 
exportation of many of those account numbers to a domain 
registered in Russia, fraudulent charges on many consumers’ 
accounts, and more than $10.6 million in fraud loss.  
Consumers and businesses suffered financial injury, 
including, but not limited to, unreimbursed fraudulent 
charges, increased costs, and lost access to funds or credit.  
Consumers and businesses also expended time and money 
resolving fraudulent charges and mitigating subsequent 
harm. 
Am. Compl. ¶ 40, JA72-73.   
As a threshold matter, the alleged exposure of a particular 
consumer’s payment information, or a consumer’s efforts to redress such 
exposure, do not give rise to a “substantial” injury—indeed, as this 
Court has held, such exposure and inconvenience do not even give rise 
to an injury sufficient to support Article III standing.  See, e.g., Reilly v. 
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Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42-46 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Remijas v. 
Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 WL 4627893, at *3-4 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014).  Thus, the key allegations in Paragraph 40 are 
that the criminal cyberattack on Wyndham resulted in “fraudulent 
charges on many consumers’ accounts, and more than $10.6 million in 
fraud loss ... including, but not limited to, unreimbursed fraudulent 
charges, increased costs, and lost access to funds or credit.”  Am. Compl. 
¶ 40, JA73.  But the careful phrasing here is too clever by half. 
The FTC does not, and cannot plausibly, allege that consumers 
suffered $10.6 million in “fraud loss.”  Federal law, after all, generally 
caps consumer liability for credit or debit card fraud at $50, see 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1643(a)(1)(B), 1693g(a), and card brands go one step further 
by eliminating that liability altogether for both credit and debit cards.7  
Thus, as the FTC conceded at the hearing below, “[w]e are not saying 
$10.6 million in unreimbursed fraud charges.”  JA189 (emphasis added).  
                                      
7  See Visa, http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/zero-liability.jsp 
(“zero liability” for fraudulent charges); MasterCard, 
http://www.mastercard.us/zero-liability.html (same); American Express, 
https://www.americanexpress.com/us/content/fraud-protection-center/ 
credit-card-fraud.html (same); Discover, http://www.discover.com/ 
customer-service/fraud/protect-yourself.html (same).     
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To the extent that some consumers may have neglected to review their 
statements and paid the fraudulent charges without questioning them, 
that is the epitome of a “reasonably avoidable” injury that Section 5(n) 
excludes from the statute.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  It is no accident, thus, 
that the complaint fails to allege any facts—as opposed to legal labels or 
conclusions—that would “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678. 
The district court held otherwise by focusing on the reference in 
Paragraph 40 to “unreimbursed fraudulent charges.”  JA28.  According 
to the court, “the FTC here alleges that at least some consumers 
suffered financial injury that included ‘unreimbursed financial injury’ 
and, drawing inferences in favor of the FTC, the alleged injury to 
consumers is substantial.”  Id.  But that is not how federal pleading 
rules work.  A court cannot just speculate that a plaintiff may be able to 
satisfy the relevant legal standard.  Even if the complaint here 
adequately pleaded the existence of “unreimbursed fraudulent 
charges”—and, again, the complaint does not identify any—that would 
not satisfy the statute, as that would not explain why any such charges 
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were not “avoidable” by consumers (by simply asking their payment-
card companies to reverse them), or how any such charges were 
“substantial.”  Indeed, to Wyndham’s knowledge (and after extensive 
discovery), the FTC has been able to identify only a single consumer 
who was not fully reimbursed, and the amount of money at issue was 
$1.25 (one dollar and twenty-five cents).  Because the complaint here 
pleads no facts that plausibly state a claim of “substantial” injury to 
consumers that is not “avoidable” by consumers, the district court 
should have dismissed the complaint on this ground too.   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the order 
denying Wyndham’s motion to dismiss Count II of the FTC’s amended 
complaint, and direct the district court to grant that motion. 
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